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Abstract
We consider non zero-sum games where multiple players control the drift
of a process, and their payoffs depend on its ergodic behaviour. We es-
tablish their connection with systems of Ergodic BSDEs, and prove the
existence of a Nash equilibrium under the generalised Isaac’s conditions.
We also study the case of interacting players of different type.
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1 Introduction
The area of non-zero sum stochastic differential games has been a subject of
intensive research over the past several decades. It deals with the situation
where multiple players are each trying to maximise their payoff, but rewards
of all players do not sum up to any constant. The basic aim is to find a Nash
equilibrium point – a set of strategies for all players, such that none of them
would benefit from unilaterally deviating. The study of the connection between
this problem and backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) was pio-
neered by Hamade`ne, Lepeltier and Peng in [5], building up on their previous
work on zero-sum games in Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [7]. Since then it has been
discussed in multiple contexts, e.g. games of control and stopping by Karatzas
and Li in [11] and risk-sensitive control by El Karoui and Hamade`ne in [12].
The main goal of the present paper is to prove the existence of an equilibrium
in the case where we have two drift controlling players who are ergodic, i.e. they
choose their strategies in infinite horizon and optimise the long run average. In
a standard fashion (see, e.g. Hamade`ne and Mu [8]), we impose the so-called
generalised Isaac’s condition on the Hamiltonian, in order to ensure the attain-
ability of the infimum simultaneously for both players. We then prove that the
existence of a saddle point for the game follows from the existence of a solution
∗Research supported by the Oxford–Man Institute for Quantitative Finance and the
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to a system of Ergodic BSDEs with continuous coefficients. Using a modified
version of Picard iteration (not dissimilar in nature to the fixed point construc-
tion used by Hu and Tang in [10]), along with an array of estimates for solutions
of EBSDEs, established in Debussche, Hu and Tessitore [4] and by the authors
in [3], we prove that such a system does admit a solution. We then extend
these results to the case of finite or countably many players. As a byproduct of
developing the machinery required to deal with ergodic games, we obtain the
existence of a solution to a class of EBSDEs with continuous drivers of linear
growth. The concluding section is dedicated to asymmetric games, where one
player is purely ergodic, and the other also optimises in infinite horizon, but
values the present more than the future (i.e. uses discounting). We show that
the value of such a game exists, and demonstrate convergence to the ergodic
system as we send the discount rate to zero.
2 Setup
We begin by describing the uncontrolled forward process {Xt}t≥0, the drift of
which will be affected by the players in the sequel. Let the dynamics of {Xt}t≥0
be governed by the Itoˆ SDE:
dXt = (AXt + F (Xt))dt+ σdWt, X0 = x0 ∈ R
N , (1)
where W denotes a standard Brownian motion in RN under the measure P. We
need a few preliminary assumptions.
Assumption 1. Conditions to guarantee existence of a unique strong solution
to (1):
• The triple (Ω,F ,P) is a probability space, {Ft}t≥0 is a right-continuous
filtration and Ft is complete for each t.
• The process {Wt}t≥0 is a Brownian motion with the predictable represen-
tation property in the filtration {Ft}t≥0.
• The operator A is dissipative and generates a stable semigroup {etA}t≥0.
In other words, there exist constants µ > 0, M > 0 such that
〈Ax, x〉 ≤ −µ‖x‖2 and ‖etA‖ ≤Me−µt
hold for all x ∈ Rn and all t ≥ 0. Here and for the rest of the paper ‖ · ‖
denotes the Euclidean norm (or Frobenius norm for a matrix).
• The map F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous and bounded.
• The matrix σ is invertible.
Remark 1. As we will be considering the ergodic behaviour of (1), under a
variety of probability measures, we need to be careful not to complete our filtra-
tions in the usual way. The above requirement is non-standard, but it is easy to
see that all the usual existence proofs hold via pasting in time.
The following result is a straightforward application of Gro¨nwall’s lemma
and the dissipativity condition:
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Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 is satisfied, then there exists a unique strong
solution to the equation (1). Moreover,
E
(
‖Xt‖
2
)
< C(1 + ‖x0‖
2),
where the constant C depends on M,µ, but is independent of t.
Proof: Given the assumption of Lipschitz continuity, the existence of a
strong, square integrable solution to (1) is standard. Fix a constant k > 0.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to ekt‖Xt‖
2 and taking expectations, we obtain
ektE‖Xt‖
2 = E‖x0‖
2 +
∫ t
0
keks‖Xs‖
2ds+ E
∫ t
0
eksG(s)ds,
where
G(s) = 2〈AXt + F (Xt), Xs〉+ ‖σ‖
2
≤ −2µ‖Xs‖
2 + 〈F (Xs), Xs〉+ ‖σ‖
2.
Taking into account Assumption 1 and applying Cauchy–Schwarz, we see that
for any ǫ > 0, there exists Cǫ, such that
G(s) ≤ −2(µ− ǫ)‖Xs‖
2 + Cǫ,
for 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Then, choosing ǫ < µ and k < 2(µ− ǫ), we arrive at
ektE‖Xt‖
2 ≤ E‖x0‖
2 +
Cǫ
k
ekt,
concluding the proof.
Remark 2. By applying Itoˆ’s lemma to ‖Xt‖
4 and using the same reasoning
as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can also show that
E‖Xt‖
4 ≤ C(1 + ‖x0‖
4), (2)
for some constant C independent of time.
Remark 3. If F (·), the nonlinear part of the drift, is a bounded measurable
map, there still exists a solution to (1) in the weak sense. In other words, for
any T > 0, there exists1 a measure P˜T ∼ P, and an P˜T -Brownian motion W˜
such that, for t ∈ [0, T ],
Xt = e
tAx0 +
∫ t
0
esAF (Xs)ds+
∫ t
0
esAσdW˜ (s),
and this solution is unique in law (and is consistent for different values of
T < ∞, so W˜ is uniquely defined). Moreover, since this solution can be ob-
tained through a measure change from a strong solution to the equation without
drift, {W˜t}t∈[0,T ] has the predictable representation property in the filtration
{Ft}t∈[0,T ] under P˜
T , for all T . For details see, e.g. Chapters 15 and 18 in [2].
1 If we assume that Ω is a canonical Wiener space, then Kolmogorov’s extension theorem
can be used to define a measure P˜ such that P˜|FT = P˜
T |FT for all T > 0, but P˜ is generally
not equivalent to P. This is why we did not assume the usual conditions on {Ft}t≥0, as the
presence of too many null sets in F0 would be problematic. In more general settings, this
extension is a nontrivial exercise, see, for example, Parthasarathy [15].
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Let U1 × U2 be a separable metric space of controls in which (ut(ω), vt(ω))
takes values. Denote by Li : R
N × U1 × U2 → R, i = 1, 2, bounded measurable
cost functions, such that
|Li(x, u, v)− Li(x
′, u, v)| ≤ C‖x− x′‖,
for some C > 0. Given an arbitrary pair of admissible controls (u, v) (i.e. pre-
dictable stochastic processes ({ut}t≥0, {vt}t≥0)), we define the Girsanov density
ρu,vT := exp
(∫ T
0
R(ut, vt)dWt −
1
2
∫ T
0
‖R(ut, vt)‖
2ds
)
for some function R : U1 × U2 → R
N , satisfying ‖R(·, ·)‖ ≤ C¯ for some C¯ > 0.
We define the probability Pu,v,T := ρu,vT P. For each agent (i = 1, 2) we define
ergodic payoffs
J i(u, v) = lim supT→∞T
−1Eu,v,T
[ ∫ T
0
Li(Xt, ut, vt)dt
]
. (3)
The goal is to find an admissible control (u∗, v∗), such that
J1(u∗, v∗) ≤ J1(u, v∗) and J2(u∗, v∗) ≤ J2(u∗, v)
holds for all admissible (u, v).
In order to use dynamic principles to determine optimal u and v, we define
the Hamiltonian functions {Hi}i=1,2, as
Hi(x, zi, u, v) = ziR(u, v) + Li(x, u, v) (4)
for (u, v) ∈ U1 × U2. We notice that for a fixed pair of controls (u, v), for each
player (i = 1, 2), the payoff (3) is an ergodic average. Consider the follow-
ing ergodic backward stochastic differential equation (EBSDE), in which the
Hamiltonian plays the role of the driver term:
Y it = Y
i
T +
∫ T
t
[Hi(Xs, Z
i
s, us, vs)− λ
i]ds−
∫ T
t
ZisdWs. (5)
Suppose there exists a solution triplet (Y i, Zi, λi) to (5), and there also exists
a constant C = C(x0) > 0 independent of T , such that E
u,v,T |Y it | < C for all
0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞. Then, by changing measure and dividing by T , we immediately
see that
J i(u, v) = λi.
We refer to (5) as the BSDE corresponding to the value function (3). In order
to proceed we need the following assumptions:
Assumption 2. Part (i) below is called the generalised Isaac’s condition. Part
(ii) is a technical condition, the motivation behind it will be discussed later.
(i) There exist measurable maps u∗1, u
∗
2, defined on R
3N , with values in U1 and
U2 respectively, such that
H1(x, z1, u
∗
1(x, z1, z2), u
∗
2(x, z1, z2)) ≤ H1(x, z1, u, u
∗
2(x, z1, z2))
and
H2(x, z1, u
∗
1(x, z1, z2), u
∗
2(x, z1, z2)) ≤ H2(x, z1, u
∗
1(x, z1, z2), v)
holds for all (x, z1, z2, u, v) ∈ R
3N × U1 × U2.
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(ii) The mapping (z1, z2) ∈ R
2N → (H∗1 , H
∗
2 )(x, z1, z2) is continuous for any
fixed x.
One way to think about the condition above is as the natural extension of
the standard assumptions used in the zero-sum framework to the non zero-sum
case. Indeed, consider the case of two players, one maximising and the other
minimising a functional
J(u, v) = lim supT→∞T
−1Eu,v,T
[ ∫ T
0
L(Xt, ut, vt)dt
]
,
by choosing controls (ut, vt) ∈ U1 × U2 for t ≥ 0. Define the Hamiltonian
as H(x, z, u, v) = zR(u, v) + L(x, u, v). Then, using a measurable selection
argument, one could show that the standard Isaac’s condition
max
v∈U2
min
u∈U1
H(x, z, u, v) = min
u∈U1
max
v∈U2
H(x, z, u, v), ∀x, z ∈ RN
is equivalent to the existence of Borel-measurable functions u∗ : R2N → U1 and
v∗ : R2N → U2, such that
H(x, z, u∗(x, z), v∗(x, z)) ≤ H(x, z, u, v∗(x, z)) for all u ∈ U1,
H(x, z, u∗(x, z), v∗(x, z)) ≥ H(x, z, u∗(x, z), v) for all v ∈ U2.
For details, see Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [7]. Given this connection, one can
see that (i) in the Assumption 2 is a reasonable generalisation of the Isaac’s
condition.
Remark 4. We notice that, for fixed u, v, the function Hi is Lipschitz in zi.
However, Assumption 2 only gives us the existence of a so called “closed loop”
control, where the optimal processes u∗, v∗ depend on (z1, z2), and only continu-
ity of Hi is guaranteed. Therefore the standard method of proving the existence
of a solution to the corresponding Ergodic BSDE breaks down.
We should observe that Assumption 2 does not guarantee that either u∗ or
v∗ are continuous (cf. Mannucci [14] for similar assumptions).
Remark 5. In the game we consider, both players control the drift. In [8] the
authors considered the case where the resulting R(u, v) can be unbounded, but is
of linear growth with respect to the underlying process {Xt}t≥0. However, since
we are in the ergodic framework, we restrict our attention to the bounded case.
While Isaac’s condition is arguably natural, we should note that there has been
work on stochastic differential games without this assumption (see for example
Buckdahn, Li and Quincampoix [1]).
Remark 6. One may also notice the similarity between the generalised Isaac’s
condition and the definition of a saddle point. Indeed, one could think of part
(i) of Assumption 2 as ensuring the existence of Nash equilibrium controls on
the infinitesimal scale.
3 Ergodic BSDEs with continuous coefficients
and stochastic games
In this section we prove that, under our assumptions, the game has value, that
is there exists a Nash equilibrium as defined in the preceding section. We begin
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by considering two players of ergodic type, then proceed to generalise to the
case of n ∈ N ∪ {+∞} players. Finally, we show a connection with PDEs.
3.1 Games with two players of ergodic type
In order to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, the following two-step
programme needs to be carried out:
• Assuming there exists a solution to the EBSDE corresponding to control
pair (u∗, v∗) as defined in Assumption 2, establish its optimality.
• Prove the existence of a unique solution to the EBSDE with continuous
coefficients, guaranteeing this assumption holds.
In order to establish the existence of a solution to a one-dimensional ergodic
BSDE with driver f , the following set of assumptions on the driver needs to be
made:
Assumption 3. The ‘driver’ f : RN×RN → R is a measurable map. Moreover,
there exist constants l, κ such that∣∣f(x, 0)∣∣ ≤ l, ∣∣f(x, z)− f(x, z¯)∣∣ ≤ κ‖z − z¯‖
holds for all x, z, z¯ ∈ RN .
We begin by stating certain crucial results from the theory of Ergodic BS-
DEs. The following theorem establishes existence and uniqueness of solutions.
We omit the proof, as it can be easily constructed using the arguments in [4].
Theorem 2. Let the driver f satisfy Assumption 3. Then there exists a solution
(Y, Z, λ), where {Yt}t≥0 is adapted, {Zt}t≥0 is predictable, and λ ∈ R is a
constant, to the EBSDE
Yt = YT +
∫ T
t
[f(Xs, Zs)− λ]ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs,
such that |Yt| ≤ C(1 + ‖Xt‖
2) for some constant C > 0. There also exists a de-
terministic function v : RN → R, such that Yt = v(Xt). Moreover, the solution
is unique in the class of Markovian solutions, for which the Y component is of
polynomial growth with respect to X.
We now show that if both players can find a Markovian solution of polyno-
mial growth to their respective EBSDEs with optimal pair of controls (u∗, v∗),
then by so doing they find a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Assume that there exist two triplets (Y i, Zi, λi), i = 1, 2, such
that
Y it = Y
i
T +
∫ T
t
[Hi(Xs, Z
i
s, u
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s ), v
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s ))− λ
i]ds−
∫ T
t
ZisdWs, (6)
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < 0, where the pair (u∗, v∗) is as in Assumption
2. Moreover, assume there exist two deterministic functions with polynomial
growth yi(x), i = 1, 2, such that Y
i
t = yi(Xt) holds P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0. Then
the control (u∗(Xs, Z
1
s , Z
2
s ), v
∗(Xs, Z
1
s , Z
2
s )) is a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: We focus on the case i = 1. For t ≥ 0 write u∗t = u
∗(Z1t , Z
2
t ) and
v∗t = v
∗(Z1t , Z
2
t ). The control (u
∗, v∗) is clearly admissible. For an arbitrary
admissible control u, for any T > 0, the pair (u, v∗) generates a measure Pu,v
∗,T ,
under whichWu,v
∗
t =Wt−
∫ t
0 R(us, v
∗
s )ds is a Brownian motion on [0, T ]. Then,
since (Y 1, Z1, λ1) solves the EBSDE,
λ1T = Y 1T − Y
1
0 +
∫ T
0
[H1(Xs, Z
1
s , u
∗
s, v
∗
s )− Z
1
sR(ut, v
∗
s )− L1(Xs, us, v
∗
s )]ds
−
∫ T
0
Z1sdW
u,v∗
s +
∫ T
0
L1(Xs, us, v
∗
s )ds.
Taking expectations with respect to Pu,v
∗,T , and remembering that λ1 is a
constant, we arrive at
λ1 ≤
1
T
Eu,v
∗,T [Y 1T − Y
1
0 ] +
1
T
Eu,v
∗,T
[∫ T
0
L1(Xs, us, v
∗
s )ds
]
,
since
H1(Xs, Z
1
s , u
∗
s, v
∗
s )− Z
1
sR(ut, v
∗
s )− L1(Xs, us, v
∗
s ) ≤ 0
by the definition of (u∗, v∗). We recall that Y 1 is of polynomial growth in X ,
and the latter has all moments under Pu,v
∗
uniformly in t (for details see, e.g.
[4]). Thus, taking lim sup on both sides, we obtain
λ1 ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Eu,v
∗,T
[ ∫ T
0
L1(Xs, us, v
∗
s )ds
]
= J1(u, v∗).
For u = u∗ the inequality everywhere becomes equality by the definition of the
pair (u∗, v∗) in Assumption 2. In the same way, we observe J2(u∗, v∗) = λ2 ≤
J2(u∗, v) for any admissible control v, finishing the proof.
Remark 7. The result of Theorem 3 shows that even in the case where admis-
sible controls are allowed to be non-Markovian, the values λi, i = 1, 2 obtained
as solutions to the system (6) are still optimal. In other words, using the gener-
alised Isaac’s condition, we can show the existence of “closed loop” or “feedback”
controls that are optimal in the larger class of “open loop” or “predictable” con-
trols.
We now proceed to the second step of our programme. We prove that there
exists a solution to the system of ergodic BSDEs (6). The following auxiliary
result is a weak version of a comparison theorem for the ergodic values λ, which
holds in multiple dimensions.
Lemma 1. Let f i, i = 1, 2 be two drivers, such that for any (x, z1, z2)
|f i(x, z1, z2)| ≤ C‖zi‖+ C¯
for some constants C, C¯ > 0. Suppose that there exist Markovian solutions
(Y i, Zi, λi), i = 1, 2 to the corresponding EBSDEs. Let λ be the ergodic part of
the solution (Y, Z, λ) to the EBSDE
−dYt = [(C‖Zt‖+ C¯)− λ]ds− ZtdWt.
Then λi ≤ λ for i = 1, 2.
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Proof: Define a measure QT as follows:
dQT
dP
:= E
(∫ T
0
f(Zt)− f(Z
i
t)
‖Zt − Zit‖
2
(Zt − Z
i
t)dWt
)
,
where f(z) = C‖z‖+ C¯. Then under QT , the process {Xt}t≥0 is ergodic with
some invariant measure µ. Since we only consider Markovian solutions, we
know that Y it = v
i(Xt), Yt = v(Xt) and Z
i
t = ζ
i(Xt) (for details on Markov
representation, see e.g. Fuhrman, Hu and Tessitore [6]). Then, integrating the
difference vi(x) − v(x), we obtain∫
RN
(vi(x)− v(x))µ(dx)
=
∫
RN
EQ
T
[
(vi(XT )− v(XT )) +
∫ T
0
f i(Xt, Z
1
t , Z
2
t )− f(Z
i
t)dt− T (λ
i − λ)
]
µ(dx)
=
∫
RN
(vi(x) − v(x))µ(dx) − T (λi − λ)
+
∫ T
0
∫
RN
f i(x, ζ1(x), ζ2(x)) − f(ζi(x))µ(dx)dt,
from which we immediately see that
λi − λ =
∫
RN
(f i(x, ζ1(x), ζ2(x)) − f(ζi(x)))µ(dx) ≤ 0,
finishing the proof.
There are two apparent ways to attack the problem of proving the existence
of a solution to (6):
(i) For any t ≥ 0, equation (6) gives us a map Y it+1 → Y
i
t for i ∈ 1, 2. If we
integrate with respect to the ergodic measure π for the forward process
{Xt}t≥0, we have a new map. Now we know that the solution to (6) is its
fixed point. To proceed, we would need to prove certain compactness and
continuity properties for this map.
(ii) We could attempt construction of a solution iteratively using a form of
Picard iteration.
In this paper we focus on plan (ii). The main result of this section is as
follows:
Theorem 4. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied. Then there exist
solution triplets (Y i, Zi, λi), i = 1, 2, where Y i is adapted, Zi predictable, and
λi a constant, such that
Y it = Y
i
T +
∫ T
t
[Hi(Xs, Z
i
s, u
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s )(x), v
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s )(x)) − λ
i]ds−
∫ T
t
ZisdWs,
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < 0. Moreover, there exist deterministic functions with
polynomial growth y1(x), y2(x), such that Y it = y
i(Xt), i = 1, 2 holds P - a.s.
for all t ≥ 0.
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Proof: We begin by setting Zi,0 ≡ 0 for i = 1, 2. Given a set of Markovian
solutions {(Y i,n−1, Zi,n−1, λi,n−1)}i=1,2 obtained previously, there exist deter-
ministic functions {ζi,n−1}i=1,2, such that Z
i,n−1
t = ζ
i,n−1(Xt). We define the
next iteration as a solution to the EBSDE
dY i,nt = −[f
i,n(Xt, Z
i,n
t )− λ
i,n]dt+ Zi,nt dWt, i = 1, 2 (7)
where
f i,n(x, z) = Hi
(
x, z, u∗
(
ζ1,n−1(x), ζ2,n−1(x)
)
, v∗
(
ζ1,n−1(x), ζ2,n−1(x)
))
.
We note that for all n ≥ 1, the drivers {f i,n}i=1,2 are uniformly Lipschitz in the
z component, since∣∣f i,n(x, z)− f i,n(x, z′)∣∣ = ∥∥R((u∗, v∗)(ζ1,n−1, ζ2,n−1))∥∥‖z − z′‖ ≤ C‖z − z′‖.
We therefore know that there exists a solution {(Y i,n, Zi,n, λi,n)}i=1,2 to (7).
It remains to show that there exists a convergent subsequence with limit
{(Y i, Zi, λi)}i=1,2. By Lemma 1, there exists a constant λ > 0, such that
|λi,n| ≤ λ, i = 1, 2
holds for all n ≥ 1. We can therefore find a subsequence {nk}k∈N, such that
λi,nk → λi, i = 1, 2 for some {λi}i=1,2. One can also show (see Theorem 8 in
[3]), that for all n ≥ 1, there exist deterministic functions {vi,n}i=1,2, such that
Y i,nt = v
i,n(Xt), Z
i,n
t = ∇v
i,n(Xt)σ and
|Y i,nt | = |v
i,n(Xt)| ≤ C(1 + ‖Xt‖
2) (8)
holds for some constant C > 0 independent of n. (As shown in [3], this constant
depends on supx∈Rn F (x) and on the Lipschitz constant of f
i,n(x, z) in the z
component. The fact that the latter is uniform in n follows from the definition
of the Hamiltonian.) Moreover, we have the following gradient estimate:
‖∇vi,n(x)‖ ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2) (9)
for i = 1, 2, n ∈ N. Since RN is separable, there exists a dense countable subset
B ⊂ Rn. We can therefore extract a further subsequence {nkl}, such that
vi,nkl (x)→ vi(x), i = 1, 2,
for all x ∈ B, and some vi : B → R. Given (9), we know that the sequence
{vi,n}n∈N is locally Lipschitz uniformly in n, and thus we can extend {v
i}i=1,2
to the whole of RN by continuity. NB: For the sequel we use n instead of nkl
for notational simplicity, assuming we work with this subsequence.
We now prove that the sequence {Zi,n}n∈N is Cauchy. It is known (see, e.g.
[4]) that, since Zi,n is Markovian, it has the following representation:
Zi,nt = ∇v
i,n(Xt)σ, for all t ≥ 0.
Hence, by (9), we see that
E‖Zi,nt ‖ ≤ C¯E(1 + ‖Xt‖
2) ≤ C˜(1 + ‖x0‖
2), (10)
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for some constants C¯, C˜ that are uniform in t, n. Now, set Y i,nt = v
i,n(Xt) for
i = 1, 2 and n ∈ N. Denote Y¯ = Y i,n − Y i,m, Z¯ = Zi,n −Zi,m, λ¯i = λi,n − λi,m
for i = 1, 2. For all T ≥ 0, applying Itoˆ’s lemma to Y¯ 2 and taking expectations,
we obtain
Y¯ 20 = E
[
Y¯ 2T
]
− 2E
[ ∫ T
0
Y¯tf¯(t)dt
]
+ λ¯E
[ ∫ T
0
Y¯tdt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
‖Z¯t‖
2dt
]
, (11)
where f¯(t) = f i,n(Xt, Z
i,n) − f i,m(Xt, Z
i,m) in the notation above. Using the
definition of f¯(t), estimate (9) and Remark 2, we see that
E|f¯(t)|2 ≤ c¯E(1 + ‖Xt‖
4) ≤ c(1 + ‖x0‖
4),
where c and c¯ are some constants that do not depend on n,m. Thus, applying
Cauchy–Schwartz and the dominated convergence theorem, we conclude that
E
[ ∫ T
0
Y¯sf¯(t)dt
]
→ 0,
as n,m → ∞. The other terms in (11) tend to zero by construction, and thus
{Zi,n}n≥0 is convergent in L
2
T (W ) for all T ≥ 0, where
L2T (W ) :=
{
predictable processes θ : E
[ ∫ T
0
‖θt‖
2dt
]
<∞
}
.
In other words, there exist limits Z1, Z2, such that
E
[ ∫ T
0
‖Zi,nt − Z
i
t‖
2dt
]
→ 0, i = 1, 2
for all T ≥ 0.
It remains to show the driver term is also convergent in the appropriate
topology. For all T ≥ 0 we have
E
∫ T
0
∣∣f i,n(Xs, Zi,ns )−Hi(Xs, Zis, u∗(Z1s , Z2s ), v∗(Z1s , Z2s ))∣∣ds
≤ E
∫ T
0
∣∣f i,n(Xs, Zi,ns )− f i,n(Xs, Zi,n−1s )∣∣ds
+ E
∫ T
0
∣∣f i,n(Xs, Zi,n−1s )−Hi(Xs, Zis, u∗(Z1s , Z2s ), v∗(Z1s , Z2s ))∣∣ds.
(12)
By definition of the Hamiltonian,∣∣f i,n(Xs, Zi,ns )− f i,n(Xs, Zi,n−1s )∣∣ ≤ C∥∥Zi,ns − Zi,n−1s ∥∥,
showing the convergence of the first term in (12) to zero. We recall that conver-
gence in L2 implies convergence in measure, which in turn implies convergence
a.e. for a subsequence. Therefore there exists a subsequence {nk}k∈N, such that
Zi,nk → Zi P⊗ dt− a.e., i = 1, 2.
Recall that
f i,n(Xs, Z
i,n−1
s ) = Hi(Xs, Z
i,n−1
s , u
∗(Z1,n−1s , Z
2,n−1
s ), v
∗(Z1,n−1s , Z
2,n−1
s ))
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and, given the continuity assumption on f i,n(Xs, Z
i,n−1
s ) in (Z
1,n−1
s , Z
2,n−1
s ),
we conclude that
f i,nk(Xs, Z
i,nk−1
s )→ Hi(Xs, Z
i
s, u
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s ), v
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s )) P⊗ dt− a.e.
and convergence of the second term in (12) follows by the dominated convergence
theorem. We have shown that
lim
n→∞
f i,nk(Xs, Z
i,nk
s ) = Hi(Xt, Z
i
s, u
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s ), v
∗(Z1s , Z
2
s )) in L
2
T (R
N )
for all T ≥ 0. This concludes the proof.
Remark 8. We can now see why part (ii) in Assumption 2 was necessary. In
order to use the BSDE approach, we had to prove that a solution to a certain
system of equations exists. We constructed such solution as a limit, and then
had to show that the driver terms converged as well. Therefore, continuity of
the Hamiltonian (which played the role of the driver) in (z1, z2) was naturally
required.
Remark 9. One interesting question is the connection between solutions to fi-
nite horizon games (i.e. systems of BSDEs with continuous coefficients) and
their ergodic counterpart. For a detailed account of the one dimensional Lips-
chitz case, see Hu, Madec and Richou [9]. In the present context, given that at
the optimum the drivers are only continuous, a measure change technique is not
available, so the techniques used in [9] cannot be easily transferred.
One simple line of attack would be to fix one player’s strategy at the ergodic
optimum and focus on the long-run behaviour of the other player. This reduces
the problem to the known case, but raises more questions than it answers, since
the control is no longer closed loop. Thus, even though convergence of the solu-
tion is guaranteed (as in [9]), the interpretation of this system of equations as
a stochastic game is lost.
Considering the system of BSDEs with continuous coefficients directly is
a challenging task. In particular, as there are no uniqueness results in this
context, and measure change techniques are not available, it proves difficult to
demonstrate convergence of solutions without significant further exploration of
this theory. We leave these questions for future research.
3.2 Quick detour into one dimensional EBSDEs
In this section we leave the world of games and control and apply the machinery
established above to the case of one dimensional ergodic BSDE with a continuous
driver of linear growth (in the z component). We begin by proving an auxiliary
lemma that establishes a useful representation of this class of functions.
Lemma 2. Suppose we are given a function f : Rd → R, that is continuous and
of linear growth, that is, there exists a constant κ > 0, such that |f(x)| ≤ κ(1 +
‖x‖) for all x ∈ RN . Then there exist uniformly bounded functions φ(·), ψ(·),
such that
f(x) = φ(x)x + ψ(x),
holds for all x ∈ Rd.
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Proof: We first notice that, given that f is of linear growth, there exists a
constant C > 0 such that ‖f(x)‖ ≤ C‖x‖ for all x : ‖x‖ ≥ 1. Define
φ(x) := 1‖x‖≥1
f(x)
‖x‖2
x⊤, ψ(x) := 1‖x‖<1f(x),
where x⊤ is the transpose of x. The claim follows immediately.
Remark 10. Notice that we have no continuity assumption on the individual
components φ, ψ. One can clearly see that this decomposition is inspired by the
structure of the Hamiltonian in the games framework.
Taking into account the result of Lemma 2, we are therefore interested in
the equation
Yt = YT +
∫ T
t
[f(Xs, Zs)− λ]ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs, (13)
where one can find functions φ(·), ψ(·), such that f(x, z) = φ(x, z)z + ψ(x, z),
and there exist constants c, C > 0, such that
‖φ(x, z)‖ ≤ c, |ψ(x, z)| ≤ C, (14)
holds for all x, z ∈ RN . In general, the existence of a solution to (14) does not
follow from the standard theorems about EBSDEs, for the driver f(·, ·) may not
be Lipschitz. However, the technique developed for the game setup still gives
the following result:
Theorem 5. Suppose the driver f : RN × RN → R is a measurable map, such
that f(x, ·) is continuous for all x ∈ RN and there exists a constant κ > 0, such
that ∣∣f(x, z)∣∣ ≤ κ(1 + ‖z‖).
Then there exists a solution (Y, Z, λ) to the EBSDE (13). Moreover, there exists
a deterministic locally Lipschitz function v : RN → R, such that Yt = v(Xt) for
all t ≥ 0.
Proof: We use the iteration method developed in the previous section in
the games context. Set Z0s ≡ 0, and let (Y
n, Zn, λn) be a solution to
Y nt = Y
n
T +
∫ T
t
[φ(Xs, Z
n−1
s )Z
n
s + ψ(Xs, Z
n−1
s )− λ
n]ds−
∫ T
t
Zns dWs, (15)
where the process {Zn−1s }s≥0 is a known Markovian solution we obtained on
the previous iteration. In other words, Zn−1s = ζ
n−1(Xs) for some deterministic
function ζn−1 : RN → RN . In the notation of Lemma 2, set
fn(x, z) = φ(x, ζn−1(x))z + ψ(x, ζn−1(x)).
We notice that there exist constants c, C > 0, such that |fn(x, 0)| ≤ C, and
|fn(x, z) − fn(x, z′)| ≤ c‖z − z′‖, so by Theorem 2 there exists a solution
(Y n, Zn, λn) to (15). There also exist deterministic functions yn : RN → R, ζn :
RN → RN , such that Y ns = v
n(Xs), Z
n
s = ζ
n(Xs). Moreover, estimates (8) and
12
(9) hold uniformly in n. We can therefore use the diagonalisation procedure on
some dense countable subsetB ⊂ RN , in order to obtain the function v : B → R,
and λ ∈ R, such that
v(x) = lim
k→∞
vnk(x) for all x ∈ B, and λ = lim
k→∞
λnk
for some subsequence {nk}k≥0. We can then extend v to the entirety of R
N by
continuity. We then proceed to show convergence of {Znk}k≥0 in L
2
T (W ) for all
T ≥ 0 in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4. We finally extract
a further subsequence that converges P⊗ dt− a.e., and use the fact that
|fn(Xs, Z
n
s )− f(Xs, Zs)|
≤ |fn(Xs, Z
n
s )− f
n(Xs, Z
n−1
s )|+ |f
n(Xs, Z
n−1
s )− f(Xs, Zs)|
≤ c‖Zns − Z
n−1
s ‖+ |f(Xs, Z
n−1
s )− f(Xs, Zs)|.
Using the dominated convergence theorem along with the continuity of f , we
conclude the convergence of the driver term.
Remark 11. We notice that the proof above extends naturally to the case of
multiple dimensional EBSDEs with an appropriate diagonal boundedness struc-
ture. In other words, consider the system
Y it = Y
i
T +
∫ T
t
[f i(Xs,Zs)− λ]ds−
∫ T
t
ZisdWs, i = 1, . . . , n,
where Z denotes the vector of Z-components. Suppose for all i = 1, . . . , n and
for all x ∈ RN , the map z → f i(x, z) is continuous, and for every i, we know
|f i(x, z)| ≤ κ(1 + ‖zi‖) for some κ > 0. Then the system admits a solution.
Remark 12. Similar to the setting of finite horizon BSDEs with continuous
coefficients considered by Lepeltier and San Martin (see [13]), we do not obtain
any uniqueness result. Of course one could only hope for the uniqueness of the
ergodic values, since Y + c for any constant c also solves the same equation.
The difficulty in applying the standard technique to establish uniqueness for
λ’s is that this uses a change of measure to remove a drift term of the form
[f(Xs, Zs)− f(Xs, Z
′
s)]ds. This is not possible in the present framework due to
the fact that f(x, ·) is not Lipschitz.
3.3 Connection to PDEs
In this section we briefly show the relation between Theorem 4 and the existence
of a solution to the following system of elliptic ergodic HJB equations:{
Ly1(x) +H1(x,∇y
1(x)σ, u∗(x), v∗(x)) = λ1,
Ly2(x) +H2(x,∇y
2(x)σ, u∗(x), v∗(x)) = λ2,
(16)
where
u∗(x) = u∗(∇y1(x)σ,∇y2(x)σ), v∗(x) = v∗(∇y1(x)σ,∇y2(x)σ),
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the functions yi(·), i = 1, 2 are as in Theorem 4, and L is a linear operator
defined as
Lv(x) =
1
2
Tr
(
σσ′(x)∇2v(x)
)
+ 〈Ax+ F (x),∇v(x)〉.
We notice that if we define the transition semigroup {Pt}t≥0 associated with
the process {Xt}t≥0 by
Pt[φ](x) = E[φ(Xt)],
for all measurable functions φ : RN → R of polynomial growth, then L is the
generator of {Pt}t≥0. Similarly to Debussche, Hu and Tessitore [4], we adopt
the following definition:
Definition 1. Two pairs {(yi, λi)}i=1,2 (y
i : RN → R, λi ∈ R) are called a
mild solution to (16), if
(i) The functions {yi(x)}i=1,2 are in C
1 and of polynomial growth.
(ii) The gradient functions {∇yi(x)}i=1,2 are of polynomial growth.
(iii) For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , for all x ∈ RN , and for i = 1, 2,
yi(x) = PT−t[y
i](x) +
∫ T
t
(
PT−s
[
Hi(x,∇y
i(·)σ, u∗(·), v∗(·))
]
(x) − λi
)
ds,
where u∗, v∗ are as above.
We therefore automatically have the following result:
Theorem 6. Suppose conditions in Theorem 4 are satisfied. Then {(yi, λi)}i=1,2
is a unique mild solution to the system (16). Conversely, if {(y˜i, λ˜i)}i=1,2 is a
mild solution to (16), then, setting Y it = y˜
i(Xt), i = 1, 2, we obtain a solution
to the system of EBSDEs (6).
3.4 Games with n > 2 players
In this section we consider a game between n ∈ N ∪ {∞} ergodic players. As
in the case of two players, we show that the existence of a solution to a certain
system of ergodic BSDEs guarantees the existence of a saddle point (provided
a version of generalised Isaac’s condition is assumed). We then proceed to
prove the former. We show that the scenario of finitely many players is a
relatively straightforward extension of Theorem 4, but extra care is required for
the countable case.
Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be the vector of controls, such that (ω, t) 7→ ut(ω) is
a predictable process with values in a separable metric space U = U1 × · · · ×
Un. Denote z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ R
n×N . We define the Hamiltonian functions
{Hi}i=1,...,n, as
Hi(x, zi,u) = ziR(u) + Li(x,u),
where, similar to the two player case, Li : R
N × U → R, i = 1 . . . n are measur-
able cost functions Lipschitz in x, and the function R : U → RN corresponds to
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the control of the drift by players through the change of measure Pu,v,T := ρu,vT P,
where
ρuT := exp
(∫ T
0
R(ut)dWt −
1
2
∫ T
0
‖R(ut)‖
2ds
)
.
The payoffs are defined as
J i(u) = lim supT→∞T
−1Eu,T
[ ∫ T
0
Li(Xt,ut)dt
]
,
for i = 1 . . . n, and the goal is to find admissible vector of controls u∗, such that
for all i = 1 . . . n,
J i(u∗i ,u−i) ≥ J
i(u∗),
holds for all admissible controls u−i, where u−i denotes the vector u without
its i-th component. The generalised Isaac’s conditions become:
Assumption 4. Suppose n <∞.
(i) There exists a measurable map u∗ : R(n+1)N → U , such that for each
i = 1 . . . n
H∗i (x, z) := Hi(x, zi,u
∗(x, z)) ≤ Hi(x, zi, ui,u
∗
−i(x, z))
holds for all (x, z, ui) ∈ R
(n+1)N × Ui.
(ii) The mapping z ∈ Rn×N → H∗(x, z) is continuous for any fixed x. Here
H∗ denotes the vector of H∗i .
As an immediate extension of the two player case we get the following result,
the proof of which is identical to that of Theorem 3 with certain amount of
notational care:
Theorem 7. Given Assumption 4, suppose that there exist n ≥ 2 triplets
(Y i, Zi, λi), i = 1 . . . n, such that
Y it = Y
i
T +
∫ T
t
[Hi(Xs, Z
i
s,u
∗(Zs))− λ
i]ds−
∫ T
t
ZisdWs, (17)
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < 0. Moreover, assume there exist n deterministic
functions with polynomial growth yi(x), i = 1 . . . n, such that Y
i
t = yi(Xt) holds
P - a.s. for all t ≥ 0. Then the control u∗(Xs,Zs) is a Nash equilibrium.
For the case of finitely many players, we can show that the system (17)
admits a solution using exactly the same Picard iteration as in the proof of
Theorem 4. In other words, we set Z0 ≡ 0, and given a set of Markovian
solutions {(Y i,n−1, Zi,n−1, λi)}i=1,...,n obtained previously, we define the next
iteration as a solution to
dY i,nt = −[f
i,n(Xt, Z
i,n
t )− λ
i,n]dt−
∫ T
t
Zi,nt dWt, i = 1, . . . , n,
where
f i,n(Xs, Z
i,n) = Hi(Xs, Z
i,n
s ,u
∗(Zn−1s )).
The rest of the proof is identical.
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3.4.1 Infinite player games
For a countable number of players additional care is needed. First, condition
(ii) in Assumption 4 needs to be reformulated. This is due to the fact that in
infinite dimensions not all norms are equivalent, and therefore in order to have
a notion of continuity, we need to specify the topology on infinite dimensional
vectors z. Let θi denote the i-th component of the vector θ, and define
L2ǫ,loc :=
{
predictable processes θ : E
[ ∞∑
i=1
1
i1+ǫ
∫ T
0
‖θit‖
2dt
]
<∞, for all T
}
.
Given the fact that constants in the estimate (10) do not depend on time or the
number of iteration, we know that there exists a constant C > 0 such that
E
[ ∫ T
0
‖Zi,nt ‖dt
]
< CT, for all T > 0,
holds uniformly in i, n. Hence Zn ∈ L2ǫ,loc for all n ≥ 0. It is clear that
componentwise convergence of Zn to Z in L2T (W ) for all T > 0 guarantees
convergence of Zn to Z in L2ǫ,loc. We also notice that, in the proof of Theo-
rem 4 we use continuity of the vector of Hamiltonians H∗ for each component
separately. Therefore, the infinite dimensional analogue of (i) in Assumption 4
remains exactly the same, while (ii) becomes
(ii) The mapping z ∈ L2ǫ,loc → H
∗
i (x, z) is continuous (for P × dt almost all
(ω, t)) for each i ∈ N.
Secondly, the construction of a convergent subsequence for the vector of ergodic
values λk needs modification. This is due to the fact that infinite dimensional
cubes are not compact. However, the result of Lemma 1 clearly holds, ensuring
that each component λi,k lies in a compact (uniformly in k), and thus we can
use a diagonalisation procedure to construct a limit λ. Using (ii) instead of (ii),
the rest of the proof remains the same.
Remark 13. Even though the topology L2ǫ,loc looks artificial, it has an intuitive
interpretation. As pointed out in Remark 6, the generalised Isaac’s condition is
an equivalent of Nash equilibrium on the infinitesimal scale. Hence the Hamil-
tonians {Hi}i≥1 in some sense represent “local values” for each player. We
also note that the vector {Zt}t≥0 can be seen as a vector of strategies, since it
determines the values of optimal controls {u∗t }t≥0.
Therefore continuity of {Hi}i≥1 in z ∈ L
2
ǫ,loc means that, when finitely many
“neighbours” (the term can be made rigorous if we put a graph structure on the
space of agents) of player i ∈ N ∪ {∞} perturb their strategies only slightly, the
change in his local value will be insignificant as well, even if distant agents make
substantial changes.
Further generalisations may include the case of infinite dimensional forward
process, the presence of Le´vy noise, as well as the introduction of time peri-
odicity. Given that the corresponding existence and uniqueness results were
established in [3] (for the case where X takes values in a separable Hilbert
spaces), we expect that all the results of the present paper should still hold
true.
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Given the existence result for a game between countably many players, the
next natural step would be to look at ergodic mean-field type games. The
difficulty with doing this is the continuity assumption on the Hamiltonian, which
depends on the topology on z. Since our result is quite generic, it allows for
the introduction of additional dependancies between policies of various players,
provided that we still have the corresponding version of the generalised Isaac’s
condition.
4 Stochastic games with asymmetric agents
In this section we consider a game between two players of different type. The
main goal is to understand whether there is a fundamental difference between
an ergodic player (as defined above), and one who discounts the future as the
discount rate becomes negligible. We define the payoff structure as follows:
J1(x0, u, v) = lim supT→∞T
−1Eu,v,T
[ ∫ T
0
L1(Xt, ut, vt)dt
]
,
J2(x0, u, v) = E
u,v,T
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−αtL2(Xt, ut, vt)dt
]
,
where α is some positive constant. In the sequel we will be calling the player of
the first type ‘ergodic’, and of the second ‘discounting’. We begin by proving
an analogue of Theorem 3 for this case:
Theorem 8. Let the Hamiltonians {Hi}i=1,2 be defined as in (4) and suppose
Assumption 2 holds. Suppose further that there exist a triplet (Y, Z, λ), and a
pair (Y˜ , Z˜) such that{
Yt = YT +
∫ T
t
[H1(Xs, Zs, u
∗(Zs, Z˜s), v
∗(Zs, Z˜s))− λ]ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs,
Y˜t = Y˜T +
∫ T
t
[H2(Xs, Z˜s, u
∗(Zs, Z˜s), v
∗(Zs, Z˜s))− αY˜s]ds−
∫ T
t
Z˜sdWs,
(18)
holds for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < 0. Moreover, assume there exist two determinis-
tic functions with polynomial growth y(x), y˜(x), such that Yt = y(Xt) and Y˜t =
y˜(Xt) holds P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0. Then the control (u
∗(Xs, Zs, Z˜s), v
∗(Xs, Zs, Z˜s))
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We first notice that, since the Hamiltonian structure remains the
same, the proof for the ergodic player is identical to that in Theorem 3. We
therefore focus on the discounting one. For an arbitrary admissible control v, the
pair (u∗, v) generates a measure Pu
∗,v under which dWu
∗,v
t = dW −R(u
∗
t , vt)dt
is a Brownian motion. Then
d(e−αtY˜t) = −e
−αt
(
[H2(Xt, Z˜t, u
∗
t , v
∗
t ) + Z˜tR(u
∗
t , vt)]dt+ Z˜tdW
u,v∗
t
)
,
and thus, integrating and taking expectations with respect to Pu
∗,v, we obtain
Y˜0 = E
u∗,v
[ ∫ T
0
(
H2(Xt, Z˜t, u
∗
t , v
∗
t )− Z˜tR(u
∗
t , vt)− L2(Xt, u
∗
t , vt)
)
dt
]
+ e−αTEu
∗,v
[
Y˜T
]
+ Eu
∗,v
[ ∫ T
0
L2(Xt, u
∗
t , vt)dt
]
.
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Taking the lim sup on both sides, we obtain
Y˜0 ≤ E
u∗,v
[ ∫ ∞
0
L2(Xt, u
∗
t , vt)dt
]
= J2(x0, u
∗, v),
and the equality holds for v = v∗.
Theorem 9. The system (18) admits a Markovian solution in the sense of
Theorem 8.
Sketch of the proof: Since the rigorous proof is almost identical to that of
Theorem 4, we only outline the minor differences. Our first aim is to construct
a solution to the system (18) using Picard iteration (7). Notice that for a fixed
α > 0, the uniform estimates (8) and (9) hold for the ergodic BSDE as before,
while for the discounted one, (8) is replaced by
|v2,n(x)| ≤ C/α, |v2,n(x) − v2,n(0)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2),
where the constant C > 0 is independent of n and α (for details see Theorem
8 in [3]). This allows us to follow the rest of the proof of Theorem 4 with only
slight modifications.
We are now interested in what happens when we send the discount rate α to
zero. The idea is to extract a convergent subsequence from a sequence {αn}n∈N
and then study the limiting object. We begin by showing the following result:
Theorem 10. Let yα(x), y˜α(x) be the Y components of the Markovian solution
to (18), and λα be the ergodic value of the first player. Then there exists a
sequence αn ↓ 0 and two functions of polynomial growth y(·) and y˜(·), such that
yαn(x)→ y(x), λαn → λ,
(
y˜αn(x)− y˜αn(0)
)
→ y˜(x), αny˜
αn(0)→ λ˜,
holds for all x ∈ RN .
Proof: We know that, by construction, the functions yαn(·) and y˜αn(·) are
locally Lipschitz, uniformly in n. Also,
|yαn(x)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2), |y˜αn(x) − y˜αn(0)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2)
holds for all x ∈ RN . By Lemma 1 we also know that {λαn}n≥1 lie in a compact.
We can therefore use the diagonalisation procedure to construct the limit on a
dense subset of RN (e.g. QN), and then extend by continuity to the entire space.
Using arguments identical to the those in the proof of Theorem 4, we con-
clude that as the discount rate of the second player goes to zero, we can extract
a subsequence such that
J1,αn(x0, u
∗, v∗) = λαn → λ, αnJ
2,α(x0, u
∗, v∗) = αny˜
αn(x0)→ λ˜,
and we can find (λ, λ˜) by solving the following system:{
Yt = YT +
∫ T
t
[H1(Xs, Zs, u
∗(Zs, Z˜s), v
∗(Zs, Z˜s))− λ]ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs,
Y˜t = Y˜T +
∫ T
t
[H2(Xs, Z˜s, u
∗(Zs, Z˜s), v
∗(Zs, Z˜s))− λ˜]ds−
∫ T
t
Z˜sdWs.
This is in line with our intuition. Indeed, we know that for the case of one
player (i.e. a standard optimal control problem), the EBSDE is obtained a a
limit of discounted infinite horizon BSDEs.
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